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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

CHARLES E. PITTS and
ETHEL J. PITTS,

]

Plaintiffs-Appellants,
Case No. 14454
•

v.

,

LEO ROBERTS,
Defendant-Respondent.

BRIEF OF DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an action brought by plaintiff against defendant, seeking a determination that a strip of land owned
by defendant is a public thoroughfare and a declaration that
defendant's land is subject to a prescriptive easement for
plaintiffs' use.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The case was tried before the Trial Court without
a jury on June 10, 1975.

Thereafter, the Trial Court made

and entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (R.
36-39), and Judgment (R. 34-35), in favor of defendant and
against plaintiffs on both issues raised in plaintiffs' Complaint.

Plaintiffs

appeal from the Trial Court's Judgment.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
•

Defendant-Respondent seeks to affirm the Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law and the Judgment made and
entered by the Trial Court,
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Statement of Facts contained in the brief of
Plaintiffs-Appellants improperly sets forth the facts in a
light most favorable to Plaintiffs-Appellants, the losing
parties in the Trial Court.

The Utah Supreme Court repeat-

edly has held that the facts on appeal must be reviewed in
the light most favorable to the prevailing party in the court
below.

Furthermore, the Statement of Facts contained in the

brief of plaintiffs contains so many inaccuracies and inconsistencies with the evidence produced at trial that it is
essential that defendant set forth the following Statement of
Facts as found by the Trial Court and supported by the evidence.
This action does not involve the right to use an
alleyway which runs east and west between Emery Street and
Concord Street as asserted in plaintiffs1 Statement of Facts.
It involves only the right claimed by plaintiff's to use a
strip of land along the south portion of defendant's residence
property at 420 Emery Street, Salt Lake City, Utah.

The strip

of land in question is approximately five to six feet wide and
123.2 feet long (Tr. 110 and Exhibit 2-P). The action does
involve the right of any parties to use the alleyway which
extends west from the west boundary of defendant's property
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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to Concord Street or the alley which extends north along the
west boundary of plaintifffs property to 4th South Street (See
Exhibit 2-P). It is essential that there be no confusion concerning this point.
The general area in question is depicted in the
area of Exhibit 2-P which is surrounded by a red line.

The

plat indicates a 16-foot wide alleyway extending from Concord
Street east to the west boundary of defendant's property.
The alleyway then continues north at approximately the same
width along the west boundary of defendant's property to
4th South Street (Exhibit 2-P). The alleyway shown on the plat
does not extend across defendant's property (Exhibit 2-P).
The strip of land is question is an area about five to six
feet wide along the south portion of defendant's property
(Tr. 110 and Exhibit 2-P). The strip of land in question is
referred to as a "walkway" (Exhibits 6-D and 12-D).
The only testimony concerning the use of the walkway from 1920 until approximately 1954 was the testimony of
a witness called by plaintiff, Mrs* Timothy, who has lived in
a lot adjoining the alleyway to the west of defendant's property since 1952 (Tr. 80). From 1920 until 1952 she lived in
the surrounding area (Tr. 80). She testified that in 1920
the alley was gravel and not paved.

Concerning the use of

the alley in 1920, she testified:
I think most everybody they used it because
the other was just vacant property and there
hadn't been anything which they had, no reason to go over that (Tr. 81).
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

There was no testimony that anyone other than the adjoining
i

landowners used the alleyway at that time or that any persons used the portion of defendant's property in question.
There was no testimony as to the duration or frequency of
the use.
No one ever testified that a family named Potter
operated a public garage between 1920 and 1936 for repairing
and painting of cars, as asserted in plaintiff's brief.

The

plaintiffs' witness, Mrs. Timothy, testified that sometime
prior to 1952 a Mr. Potter had "a big garage there, a big
shop." Mr. Potter repaired and painted cars at the garage,
but there was no testimony that he did it for the public or
that any members of the public drove through the alley to
the garage (Tr. 87).
A second witness called by plaintiff, Holland David
Lay, had lived in the area since September, 1936.

In 1936

there were only a few homes along the alley and the owners
of those homes used the alley occasionally for delivery of
coal and hay (Tr. 95). There was no testimony that any of
those parties used the entire length of the alleyway or that
they used the property in question to the south of defendant's
property.
the alley.

There was no testimony as to how long they used
Mr. Lay testified that he has used the alley but

he never stated when he used it or whether he used the walkway in question.

He testified that a number of years ago

someone blocked the alleyway with a pole for a day or two
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
and the blockade
then
disappeared (Tr. 96).
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In 1546, plaintiffs purchased the house where they
presently reside on Concord Street at the west end of the
alleyway (Tr. 62 and Exhibit 2-P). In 1946 the alleyway was
graveled (Tr. 63). Plaintiff Charles Edward Pitts testified
only that he has driven into one end of the alley, backed
into his yard and driven out the other end of the alley "for
a long time" (Tr. 66). When he drove in the alleyway, he would
drive an old 1951 Dodge pickup truck which sometimes was operable (Tr. 66)e

He did not state when or for how long he

drove through the alleyway and he did not testify when or
for how long he drove over the strip of defendant's property
in question.
There was a conflict in the evidence as to when
the alleyway was first paved.

Rolland David Lay testified

that it was paved 12 or 13 years ago (Tr. 96). Mr. Lay testified that the Salt Lake City Street Department installed the
blacktop (Tr. 96-97).

Other witnesses testified that the

alley was blacktopped between 1952 and 1954 (Tr. 68 and 85).
There was testimony that children who used to walk through
the vacant property now walk through the alley (Tr. 85), but
there was no testimony as to whether they have walked over
the strip of land in question, or for how long or how frequently
the children walked through the alley.
Until December of 1952 there was a dedicated alleyway running north and south between 4th South Street and the

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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alleyway in question to the west of defendant's property (Exi

hibit 2-P). An action was brought by the land owners in the
area in 1952 and the alleyway was vacated by the city of Salt
Lake (Tr. 86 and Exhibit 7-D and 9-D) . Up until that time
the alleyway running north and south was a dedicated public

{

road and apparently a continuation of the alleyway running
west from the west boundary of defendant's property to Concord
Street (Exhibit 2-P).
Plaintiff Charles E. Pitts did not use the alleyway daily, as asserted in plaintiff's brief, and there is
no testimony that when he used the alleyway he used the strip
of property belonging to defendant more than a few times (Tr,
63 and 66).

As to the times that he did use defendant's pro-

perty, he testified that he merely drove over that property
"for a long time" (Tr. 66). According to his own testimony
he only used the alleyway when he was driving his old 1951
Dodge pickup truck and then only when the truck was operable
(Tr. 66). In short, there was no testimony as to the length
of the time he drove over the strip of land in question or
the frequency of his use of the property.
Plaintiff Charles E. Pitts testified that there were
two apartments near the alley and the tenants may have used the
alley aabout every day, but he does not know (Tr. 65). He testified that other people who live along the alley used the alley
to load garbage from their yards, but he never testified as to
the frequency of their use or whether any of them used the
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portion of defendant's property in question (Tr. 65). Rolland
Lay testified that he sees cars using the alley every day but
he does not know whose cars they are and he does not know
if the cars go out Emery Street from the alley by way of the
strip of property belonging to defendant (Tr, 98). He again
did not testify as to the length of time he has seen the cars
using the alley.
The defendant moved into his present residence in
June of 1971 (Tr. 109). He previously lived in the same area
from 1961 to 1971.

During that time he never observed any

traffic in the walkway.

At the time he moved into the house

in 1971, the walkway was five or six feet wide (Tr. 110), and
the alleyway extended west from his property to Concord Street
and was

eight feet wide (Tr. 115). Prom the time he moved

into the house, he has continually blocked the alleyway with
trash cans and with his car up to the south side of his property line (Tr. 114 and 115). He has not allowed people to
use the walkway since the time he moved into the house if he
can help it (Tr. 110). The walkway in question along the south
side of defendant's property is not wide enough for a car to
drive over it and stay on the pavement (Tr. 115).
With the property belonging to the defendant blocked,
the owners of the other property in the area, including the
plaintiffs, have the full use of the alleyway extending from
Concord Street east to the west boundary of defendant's property and they are not inhibited from using that dedicated
alleyway (Tr. 118).
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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I

ARGUMENT
POINT I

i

UNDER THE CARDINAL RULES OF APPELLATE REVIEW,
THE FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND JUDGMENT OF THE
TRIAL COURT MUST BE AFFIRMED.
By this appeal, the plaintiffs are attacking the
Findings

of Fact and Conclusions of Law of the Trial Court

which held that the plaintiffs have failed to establish that
the strip of land in question is a public highway or public
thoroughfare by reason of public use for more than 10 years
and that the plaintiffs have failed to establish that they
have a prescriptive right to the use of the strip of land in
question.
The rules of appellate procedure in instances in
which the appellant attacks the findings of the Trial Court
are clearly set forth in Charlton v. Hackett 11 Ut. 2d 389,
360 P.2d 176 (1961), in which the Court specified the following "cardinal rules of review" concerning the Findings and
Judgment of the Trial Court:
(1)

To indulge them a presumption of validity and

correctness;
(2)

To require the appellant to sustain the burden

of showing error;
(3)

To review the record in the light most favor-

able to them;
(4)

Not to disturb them if they find substantial

support in the evidence.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Thus, all presumptions favor the findings and judgment of the Trial Court and the party attacking those findings
and judgment has the burden of showing that they are in error
and should be overturned.

As to the review of the record,

plaintiffs-appellants recite the evidence most favorable to
their contentions to the exclusion of other evidence favorable to defendants, in addition to dlearly misstating the facts
produced in evidence, which is not permissable on appellate
review.

Thomson v. Condas 27 Ut. 2d 129, 493 P.2d 639 (1972).
Of equal and vital importance is the rule of appel-

late review governing the refusal of the Trial Court to make
findings essential to the appellant's right to recover.

The

rule is well-stated in First Western Fidelity v. Gibbons and
Reed Co. 27 Ut. 2d 1, 492 P.2d 132, (1971), which held as
follows:
Where the appellant's position is that the
trial court erred in refusing to make
certain findings essential to its right to
recover, and insists that the evidence compels such findings, it is obligated to show
that there is credible and uncontradicted
evidence which proves those contended facts
with such certainty that all reasonable minds
must so find. Conversely, if there is any
reasonable basis, either in the evidence or
from the lack of evidence upon which reasonable minds might conclude that they are not
so convinced by a preponderance of the evidence, then the findings should not be overturned . [Emphasis added].
Thus, the evidence presented at trial as summarized
in the foregoing statement of facts makes it clear that the

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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findings of the Trial Court are supported by the evidence in
the record.

Plaintiffs have failed to meet their burden of

proving that there is credible and uncontradicted evidence
which proves their allegations with such certainty that all
reasonable minds must so find and further that there is no
reasonable basis, either in the evidence or from the lack
of evidence, upon which reasonable minds might conclude that
they are not so convinced by a preponderance of the evidence.
Therefore, the findings of the Trial Court should not be disturbed and the judgment must be affirmed.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN HOLDING
THAT PLAINTIFFS FAILED TO ESTABLISH THAT
THEY ACQUIRED A PRESCRIPTIVE EASEMENT FOR
THE USE OF DEFENDANT'S PROPERTY.
Defendant has no quarrel with plaintiff's statement
of law regarding prescriptive easement as set forth in 4 Tiffany Real Property (3rd Edition), § 1191, P. 960, in which
it is stated that,
To acquire easement over land by prescription, it is necessary to show use:
1. Adverse to the owner.
2. Under a claim of right.
3. Open.
4. Notorious.
5. Continuous.
6. Uninterrupted.
7. For the period of prescription.
Defendant also has no argument with plaintiff's contention
that the period of prescription in Utah is 20 years.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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See

Anderson v. Osguthorpe

29 Ut. 2d 32, 504 P.2d 1000 (1972).

The serious error in plaintiff's arguments is that
plaintiffs totally misstate the facts produced in evidence,
state the facts in the light most favorable to plaintiffs,
and ignore the rules of appellate review set forth above.
Neither of the plaintiffs ever testified that they
used the alleyway openly and continuously since 1946, as asserted in plaintiff's brief.

The substance of the testimony of

plaintiff Charles E. Pitts is set forth in the foregoing
statement of facts.

Plaintiff Charles E. Pitts stated that

he used the alleyway on occasion for "a long time" (Tr. 66).
At the times when he used the alley, he only used it when
his old 1951 Dodge pickup truck was operable and he never
stated for how long the truck was operable or at what time
the truck was operable (Tr. 66). When the truck was operable,
there is no indication from his testimony that he drove the
truck over defendant's property other than once or twice. In
short, there is no evidence even in the statements by plaintiff Charles E. Pitts that he used defendant's property "openly
and continuously since 1946."

Additionally, the alleyway

was blocked sometime before defendant obtained the property
in 1971 (Tr. 96), and defendant continually blocked the entrance to the strip of property owned by defendant after he
purchased the property in 1971 (Tr. 110, 114, and 115).
Plaintiffs then

argue in Point I of their brief

that the claim of right by plaintiff Charles E. Pitts to use
defendant's property was that it was "apparently and obviously"
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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I
a gravel passageway open to use by the general public.

This

argument is totally inconsistent with the plaintiff's argument
that plaintiff Charles E. Pitts obtained a prescriptive easement for use of the property.

If plaintiff were able to es-

tablish that plaintiff used the alleyway in common with the
general public, this would not constitute use adverse to the
owner of the property for purposes of obtaining a prescriptive
easement.
In the case of Chournos v. Alkema/ 27 Ut. 2d 244/ 494
P.2d 950 (1972), the court held that a use by the plaintiff
in common with members of the general public is not sufficient
to establish a prescriptive easement for use of the property.
The Court reasoned as follows:
The trial court erred insofar as it founda prescriptive right in defendants based
upon public use. A prescriptive right was
originally based upon the theory of a grant
implied from long user, and it runs to the
individual and not to the public. One cannot claim a right of way as a private one
by showing it has been used by the public.
He must show user by himself or his predessors of the way to his own lot.
While a public road may be so
established, the use by individual persons in common with
the public generally is regarded
as permissive, and by such common
use no individual person can
acquire a right by prescription
as against the owner of the fee
... [cites Thornley Land and
Livestock Company v. Morgan Brothers Land and Livestock Company,
81 Ut. 317, 17 P.2d 826-27 (1932)].
[Emphasis supplied by the Court].

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Thus, even if plaintiff Charles E. Pitts could establish that he used the property owned by defendant for the
period of prescription in the same manner as the "general
public," he would clearly not have established a prescriptive
easement for use of the property.
Plaintiffs then argue that "uncontroverted testimony
of two witnesses establishes the paving of the alleyway between
1950 and 1954.

To the contrary, one of the plaintiffs' own

witnesses testified thatthe alley was paved 12 or 13 years ago
(Tr. 96). Even if the alleyway were paved in 1954 and the alleyway were used by plaintiff Charles E. Pitts continually thereafter, there would not be 20 years of uninterrupted use by plaintiff, since defendant continually blocked the alleyway beginning in 1971.

There is no testimony as to why the city paved

the portion of defendant's property when it did, but certainly
no implication can be drawn from the mere fact that someone
from the city may have installed paving material on a portion
of defendant's property, particularly when defendant prevented
people from entering the property.
There is no evidence in the record that plaintiff used
the property in question adversely to the owner, under a claim
of right, openly, notoriously, continuously, without interruption, for the period of prescription.

Therefore, neither

of plaintiffs has met the requirements of proving a prescriptive easement, for 20 years or any other period.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Thus, plaintiffs have failed to show that there is
credible and uncontradicted evidence which proves the facts
contended by plaintiff with such certainty that all reasonable
minds must so find and that there is no reasonable basis, either
in the evidence or from the lack of evidence, upon which reasonable minds might conclude that they are not so convinced by a
preponderance of the evidence•

On this basis, the finding

of the Trial Court that the plaintiffs failed to establish
a prescriptive easement in the property in question is clearly
supported by the evidence and the Trial Court's judgment based
upon the findings must be upheld.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN HOLDING
THAT PLAINTIFFS FAILED TO ESTABLISH THAT
THE PORTION OF DEFENDANT'S PROPERTY IN
QUESTION BECAME A PUBLIC THOROUGHFARE BY
PUBLIC USE FOR MORE THAN 10 YEARS.
As noted in the argument under Point II, above,
plaintiffs are making the totally inconsistent claims that,
on the one hand, plaintiffs have established a prescriptive
easement for use of the property in question and, on the other
hand, that defendant's property has impliedly been dedicated
to the public by defendant and defendant's predessors under
section 27-12-89, Utah Code Annotated, 1953.

The inconsis-

tency between these claims is pointed out in Chournos v. Alkema, Supra.
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Section 27-12-89, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, provides
as follows:
A highway shall be deemed to have been
dedicated and abandoned to the use of
the public when it has been continuously
used as a public thoroughfare for a period of 10 years.
Under this statute, an owner of property may impliedly
dedicate his property to public use as a public thoroughfare
if he allows the public to use the property for the prescribed
period under circumstances which would indicate that he intended
to dedicate his property to the use of the public in general.
The rule is well stated in Morris v. Blunt, 49 Ut. 243, 161
P.2d 1127, 1130, as follows:
A dedication rests primarily on the intent
of the owner. There must be a concession
intentionally made by him, which may be proved
by declarations or by acts, or may be inferred from the circumstances. No form or ceremony is necessary. It must, however, appear
that he knew of the use by the public, and
intended to grant the right of way to the
public. [Emphasis added]
Inasmuch as a finding by the court that the owner of
property has impliedly dedicated his property to the public
would constitute an appropriation of the individual's property
by the state, such a dedication is not taken lightly and all
presumptions are in favor of the property owner.

The rule is

stated in Bonner v. Sudbury, 18 Ut. 2d 140, 417 P.2d 646,
648, as follows:
In connection with this review we deem it
appropriate to note our agreement that the
dedication of one's property to a public
use should not be regarded lightly and that
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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certain principals should be adhered to.
The presumption is in favor of the property
owner; and the burden of establishing public
use for the required period of time is on
those claiming it. The mere fact that members of the public may use a private driveway or alley without interference will not
necessarily establish it as a public way;
nor will the fact that it was shown on the
public records to be a public street, nor
even that it had been paved and sign posted
as a public street by the city. [Emphasis
added]
Thus, all presumptions are in favor of the property
owner and a great burden of proof is placed upon the person
claiming that the land has been dedicated to a public use.

To

hold otherwise would be to allow a taking of private property
for public use without just compensation to the owner.

See

Justice Callister's dissent in Bonner v. Sudbury, Supra.
Also, the rule is clear in Utah that evidence of use
of a roadway by the owners of property adjacent to the road
does not constitute a use by the public for purposes of implied
dedication of the roadway.

Petersen v. Combe, 20 Ut. 2d 376,

438 P.2d 545 (1968).
There was no evidence produced at trial that the
portion of defendant's property in question was used continuously as a public thoroughfare by the general public for a period of 10 years.

No one testified that the defendant's pro-

perty or any portion of the alleyway was used for "general
vehicular traffic," as was argued in plaintiff's brief. Plaintiff Charles E. Pitts only observed use of the alleyway by
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tenants in an apartment house adjacent to the alley, owners of
homes adjacent to the alley, and children who played in the
alley (Tr. 65, 70, and 75).

Plaintifffs witness, Mrs. Timothy,

testified only as to use of the alley by persons who owned
property adjacent to the alley, tenants in the apartment house
adjacent to the alley, and children who played and walked in
the alley (Tr. 81-87).

She did not testify as to whether de-

fendant's property was used by those parties.
Plaintiff's other witness, Rolland David Lay, has
seen cars using the alley every day, but he does not know who
owned those vehicles (Tr. 98), and he apparently does not know
whether they are members of the general public.
testify as to the duration of the use.

He did not

Furthermore, he does

not know if those cars drive out Emery Street at the other end
of the alley (Tr. 98), and he thus does not know whether any
of those cars have ever driven onto defendant's property. According to his understanding, those cars may well have driven
to the apartment house adjacent to the alley and then have
driven out the same way they came in without crossing defendant's property (Tr. 98).
None of the testimony by the witnesses produced
by plaintiffs specified the dates of use or the frequency of
use by any of the persons who use the alley in question, other
than the use by some adjacent property owners.

There is no

testimony that the alley was ever used by the public for entrance to a garage and repair shop, as asserted by plaintiffs.
In short, there was no testimony produced at trial as to use of
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

defendant's

property by the general public or as to the fre-

quency of use or the periods of time the alley was used.
In contending that the trial court erred in refusing to find that the plaintiffs established a public use of
the road for a period of 10 years, the plaintiffs must first
prove that the defendant intentionally dedicated the strip
of land in question to the use of the public when all presumptions favor the retention of the property by the land
owner.

Bonner v. Sudbury, Supra. Since the Trial Court found

the issues in favor of the defendant and against the plaintiffs, all facts must be viewed in a light most favorable to the
defendant, and the plaintiffs have the burden of showing error.
The court will indulae the Trial Court's findings with a presumption of validity and correctness.

In order to disturb the

findings of the Trial Court, the plaintiffs must show that
there is credible and uncontradicted evidence which proves
the plaintiffs' contentions with such certainty that all reasonable minds must so find and that there is no reasonable
basis, either in the evidence or from the lack of evidence
upon which reasonable minds might conclude that the^ are not
so convinced by a preponderance of the evidence.

First Western

Fidelity v. Gibbons and Reed Co., Supra. In view of the facts
and authorities set forth above, the plaintiffs have clearly
failed to meet their burden on appeal and the findings and
judgment of the trial court must be affirmed.
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POINT IV
THE FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT CLEARLY
SUPPORT THE COURTfS JUDGMENT.
In paragraph 6 of the Trial Court's findings of
fact, the Trial Court found that the evidence presented by
the plaintiff was absolutely lacking as to any evidence of
necessity for use of defendant's property by plaintiffs. This
finding was entered by the Trial Court, inasmuch as it was
not entirely clear whether plaintiffs were claiming easement
by implication in addition to plaintiff's claims of easement
by prescription and dedication by public use (See plaintiff's
Complaint at Rl-2).

Even if the Trial Court had considered

necessity to be an element of prescriptive easement or dedication by public use, however, this would not be relevant to
plaintiff's appeal, in that the remaining findings by the
Trial Court clearly support the Trial Court's conclusions of
law and judgment (R. 34-39).
The rule is well established in Utah that a Trial
Court's iudoment should be affirmed if the court reached the
correct results even if he did not give the correct reason
for his ruling.

Foss Lewis and Sons Construction Co. v. Gen-

eral Insurance Co. of America, 30 Ut. 2d 290, 517 P.2d 539
(1973).

In the present case, the Trial Court merely added

one finding in addition to the findings which clearly supported
the Trial Court's conclusion and judgment.

The additional

finding in no way detracts from the other findings of fact.
Therefore, whether the plaintiffs did or did not claim an
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.

easement by implication
is irrelevant,
in that- fho ^ ^ i
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judgment is clearly supported by the findings of the Trial
Court.
CONCLUSION
The Trial Court madeand entered Findings of Fact
favorable to defendant.

The strona oresumption of the cor-

rectness and validity of the findings has not been overcome
by plaintiffs, nor have plaintiffs demonstrated that there
is credible and uncontradicted evidence which proves plaintiff 's contentions with such certainty that all reasonable
minds must so find and further that there is no reasonable
basis, either in the evidence or from the lack of evidence
upon which reasonable minds might conclude that they are not so
convinced by a preponderance of the evidence. Therefore,
the Trial Court's findings should not be disturbed and the
Trial Court's judgment should be affirmed.
Under the facts, cases and statutes set forth above,
defendant respectfully submits that the findinqs of the Trial
Court are supported by substantial evidence in the record,
plaintiffs have failed to meet their burden on appeal, and
the judgment of the Trial Court should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
HANSON & GARRETT
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